Abstract
Introduction
The problem of wireless handover authentication is usually concerned with mobility management. When the mobile node (MN) roams into a foreign domain, the foreign network access server (NAS) will act as a pass through authenticator (AU), and consults the authentication server in the MN's home domain (AAAH) for authentication through the foreign domain authentication server (AAAF). Currently the extensible authentication protocol (EAP) [1] [14] is used for this sort of three-party authentication.
EAP [1] defined an authentication framework which supports multiple EAP methods such as EAP-MD5 [1] and EAP-TLS [19] . In the case of three-party authentication, the AAAH verifies the certificate or identity of the MN, and generates a shared master session key (MSK) for the AU and the MN. However, according to [2] , the time for simplest EAP method EAP-MD5 is more than 70ms which does not support mutual authentication and MSK generating. For those EAP methods supporting both mutual authentication and MSK generating, the authentication latency can easily be several hundred milliseconds. This is too long for latency sensitive services such as VOIP which requires the overall handover latency of under 50ms [20] .
To optimize the EAP protocol, researchers divide the handover authentication procedure into two scenarios called inter-domain handover authentication and intra-domain handover authentication. Here interdomain handover refers to the scenario that the mobile node roams from one AU to another that belongs to different AAAF, while the intra-domain handover refers to the scenario that the mobile node roams from one AU to another within the same AAAF. Usually when inter-domain handover occurs, the full EAP procedure must be established, since the new domain needs to consult the AAAH for authenticating the mobile node. This may add additional latency to the handover procedure and put a heavy burden on the network. So, the bigger the domain is, the better efficiency the handover authentication is. In the case of intra-domain handover, several mechanisms are designed for reducing the handover authentication latency. They are called fast re-authentication protocol [4] , pre-authentication protocol [5] , context transfer based authentication protocol [7] .
The fast re-authentication protocol defined an intradomain authentication mechanism. When the mobile node roams into the AAAF domain, the AAAH distributes the domain specific root key to the AAAF after EAP procedure [4] . Thus, in the subsequent authentication procedure, the MN, the AAAF and the AU do the re-authentication procedure based on DSRK without the participation of the AAAH. The fast reauthentication protocol reduced the signaling cost and security cost between AAAF and AAAH, but it can only meet the requirement of small domains. In bigdomain environment, there may be a lot of MNs roaming from one AU to another. Since AUs still needs to consult the AAAF during handover authentication, the fast re-authentication protocol will still put a heavy burden on the AAAF. For example, assuming an AAAF manages 100 AUs, and every AU needs to authenticate 100 MNs at the same time, then the AAAF needs to generate 100*100=10,000 MSKs in a short period of time. If the key generation hash function is SHA-1, then according to [3] , the total key generating latency is 9.73ms*10,000=97.3s. If we take message encryption/decryption cost and routing cost into account, the latency on the AAAF may be several minutes. Also the fast re-authentication protocol requires a complicated key hierarchy [11] [15], which may be too costly to the carrier too.
The pre-authentication protocol is initially defined by the IEEE 802.11 work group to take the authentication service overhead out of the time-critical re-association process [5] . Since the MN can be authenticated with multiple APs, the pre-authentication procedure may put a much heavier burden on the AAAF and AAAH. In [21] , Mishra et al. report that the pre-authentication message violates the IEEE 802.11 state machine as specified in [5] . Due to those issues, the IETF uses pre-authentication only for inter-domain handover authentication [6] .
The context transfer based authentication protocol is an intra-domain handover authentication protocol. When the MN roams from the old AU to the new AU, the old AU transfers the keying material of the MN to the new AU. Thus, the authentication procedure can be initiated between the new AU and the MN without the participation of AAAF, and the burden of the AAAF is reduced. However, according to [8] , the context transfer based authentication protocol will lead to the domino effect issue, in which a compromise of one AU will lead to a compromise of another AU.
There is another category of public key based authentication solutions such as [10] . However, the mobile node and the authenticator still need to consult the AAAF for getting the public key of the other side. The handover authentication procedure will still put a heavy burden on the AAAF.
In one word, the two key issues for current solutions are the heavy burden of AAAF and the domino effect. This paper focuses on the intra-domain handover authentication in the big-domain wireless environment and presents an new elliptic curve [9] [12] based key agreement protocol with mutual authentication property (ECCHO) for solving these two issues.
ECCHO Architecture
Our scheme aims to reduce the burden of the AAAF when there are a lot of MNs roaming from one AU to another within the same AAAF domain. The AAAF domain is defined as follow. MNs form the AAAF domain. Figure 1 shows the trust model for wireless environment, where PSA refers to pre-established security association. We extract this trust model from [17] .
AAAF AAAH AU MN PSA PSA PSA Security association to be established The architecture of our scheme is summarized as follows: The AAAF initially generates and distributes some keying materials to the AU and MN. During subsequent handover authentication procedure, the AU and MN can authenticate each other using those keying materials without the participation of the AAAF. Since the AAAF is not involved in the handover process, its burden is reduced. Our scheme includes the following five parts: the keying materials generating, key distribution to AUs, key distribution to MNs, handover process and big numbers transporting.
Keying Materials Generating
The AAAF is the authentication center of the AAAF domain. Only it can generate keying materials for the mobile nodes and authenticators. The key generating process is based on the elliptic curve theory described in [9] . Section 3.1 of [9] 
Key Distribution to Authenticators
After key generating, the AAAF distributes keying materials to the authenticators within the AAAF domain. This process is independent of other process, and is initiated by the AAAF and is protected by the PSA between the AAAF and the AUs (Figure 2 ).
AAAF AU The key distribution to AUs includes three steps:
, where i is an element of MNPUBLIC .
Step
2)
The AAAF computes
, where j is an element of AUPRIVATE .
Step
3)
to the AU l . Every AU should get a different i and j .
Different from [9] , the domain base point 0 G is not distributed to AUs. Instead, the AAAF keeps it secretly.
Key Distribution to Mobile Nodes
When the mobile node enters the AAAF domain for the first time, the full EAP process is established as defined in [1] . Since only the AAAH can verify the mobile node, the pass through authenticator transports the authentication messages to the AAAF, and the latter relays it to the AAAH for authentication.
If the full EAP procedure is success, the AAAH sends a message to the AAAF for requesting the keying materials for the MN. Upon receiving the request from AAAH, the AAAF generates keying materials for the mobile node as follows:
Step 1)
where r is an element of MNPRIVATE .
2)
where s is an element of AUPUBILC . 
Handover Process
This subsection discusses the handover authentication process. We will present an authenticated key agreement mechanism without the participation of the AAAF and the AAAH. Our scheme is based on the following elliptic curve assumption [9] :
Elliptic curve security Assumption: Giving a base point G on the elliptic curve, we can easily compute K kG = ; on the other hand, giving K and G , one can hardly compute k . Thus k can be used as private key, and K can be used as public key.
Our scheme uses the following lemma:
Journal protected by an elliptic curve signature mechanism such as section 4 in [9] . After the 3-pass message exchanges, the AU and the MN can generate the shared key respectively. The shared key generating process is defined in [9] , and this key can be used as MSK for further key generating (Figure 4 ). 
Big-Number Transporting
There are two big numbers to be stored and transported in our scheme, e. 
log log (2 ) ( (2 ) )
By doing so, iM can be transported using the two numbers: However, this may add additional exponential calculation cost during handover.
Security Analysis

Correctness Analysis of Our Scheme
Our scheme includes three independent message exchange processes: the process of authenticator key distribution, the process of mobile node key distribution and the handover authentication process. In the wireless environment, the process of authenticator key distribution is protected by the PSA between the AAAF and the authenticator. The process of mobile node key distribution is protected by two PSAs: the PSA between AAAF and the AAAH; the PSA between AAAF and the mobile node. The correctness of these two processes is the same as that of [1] and [4] . So this paper only proves the correctness of the handover authentication process.
The correctness of the handover authentication process is proved by the strand space theory described Managing Handover Authentication in Big-domain Wireless Environment Changsheng Wan, Aiqun Hu, Juan Zhang in [22] .The symbols used here are the same as that of [22] . Different from the NSL strand space defined in [22] , the handover authentication process has the following initial keying materials:
The mobile node holds: The  authenticator  holds: { , , , , , , , , }
Our strand space Σ is defined as follows: Penetrator strands s P ∈
The "initiator strands" [22] , the authentication results and secrecy results can be proved using the following four propositions: Proposition 5.2, 5.8, 5.10 and 5.13 defined in [22] . The proving of our scheme is similar to the NSL protocol, so this paper will not rewrite it. There are two differences between our scheme and the NSL protocol: (1) The 2 Q and 3 Q messages are protected by the private key of the mobile node and the authenticator using the signature mechanism defined in [9] ; (2) Since only the one who holds the private key can sign the message, the mobile node and the authenticator need not send the nonces back for authentication. Thus in our scheme,
Security Strength Analysis
Our scheme generates the rMSK using the elliptic curve technique, so we refer to [18] for analyzing the security strength of our scheme. The rMSK length is not defined by [4] or any other document. So, as an example, this paper assumes the key length of rMSK is 112bits.
To negotiate a 112-bit rMSK, our scheme needs to decide the following three categories of data that will affect the security strength: the finite field size p for the elliptic curve T , the length of the four sets of prime numbers defined in section II.A, and the DH key material length.
According to [18] , modular exponentiation related algorithm with a 2100-bit module size will have about the same resistance against attack as a 112-bit 3DES key. Thus, factoring a 2100-bit integer (which is the product of two big prime numbers) will need the same time as attacking a 112-bit symmetric key. So, the length of 2100 / 2 1024bits ≈ will be enough for the four sets of prime numbers.
According to [18] , an elliptic curve group with equivalent security as 2048-bit modular exponentiation has about 200 bits. This paper uses the 193-bit elliptic curve group defined in [9] for p .
The DH algorithm is used for generating the rMSK. According to [18] , the exponents will have at least twice as many bits as the symmetric keys that will be derived from them. So, the length of 1 x and 2 x should be at least 112 * 2 224 bits bits = . Similar to the prime number restriction, to get equal security strength to the rMSK, the module used in the DiffieHellman exchange should be at least 2048bits too.
Domino Effect Analysis
The domino effect described in [8] refers to the fact that compromise of one authenticator will lead to compromise of another. This section proves our scheme is immune to the domino effect issue.
Assuming there are two authenticators:
AUTH is compromised, the attacker will get the first authenticator's keying material
. However it can not get 2 j from the first authenticator's keying material, thus it can not decrypts the message 2 defined in section II.D. Similarly, compromise of one mobile node will not lead to compromise of another in our scheme.
Efficiency Analysis
Efficiency Comparison
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Our efficiency goals include reducing the burden of the AAAF and the total security cost. Since the AAAF is not involved in the handover authentication process, its burden is reduced. This section analyzes the security cost of our scheme and [4] . Then compares them.
The security cost of [4] can be analyzed from the following three factors: time of key generating using HMAC-SHA256 algorithm ( Here we still take 112-bit 3DES as the encryption and decryption algorithm. According to [16] , the encryption for one cash line input (64bits) will need about 7364 cpu cycles. The messages to be encrypted in the fast re-authentication protocol are usually several hundred bits. So this paper takes 512-bit messages as an example. Thus the encryption time using 3DES algorithm will be 7364 *(512 / 64) 59, 000 . This means one of these mobile nodes will get a latency of over 50ms. This cannot meet the requirement of VOIP.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an elliptic curve based authenticated key agreement protocol for wireless handover authentication. It has a lower security cost than current solutions and can reduce the burden of the authentication server during handover. Also our scheme can avoid the domino effect issue. 
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